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Abstract
We examine how the bidding environment may aﬀect the outcome of tax competition
between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm’s foreign direct investment
(FDI). We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoﬀs from an English auction,
with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional
setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to
more aggressive bidding in “race beyond the bottom,” where the nations may bid
beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol
and information asymmetry on the auction outcome.
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1 Introduction
It has been well documented that countries, states, or regional authorities bid to attract
investments by giving generous tax incentives, investing in infrastructure, providing worker
education opportunities or oﬀering other benefits to the firms.1 The state of Georgia, for ex-
ample, oﬀered incentives to the value of $320 million in its winning bid for DaimlerChrysler’s
assembly plant despite South Carolina having oﬀered $346 million in incentives in its attempt
to lure the factory (New York Times, October 18, 2002). In another case, The Philippines
made a generous oﬀer to General Motors (GM), including free use of land in addition to tax
and tariﬀ cuts, but Thailand was the winner in luring GM’s Asian motor-vehicle manufactur-
ing base by waiving its domestic content requirements for the entire industry (Financial Post,
May 30, 1996).2 The empirical relevance of bidding wars for firms is confirmed by Greenstone
and Moretti (2004) and Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), among others.
One of the most important results in the literature of tax competition is the phenomenon
known as the “race to the bottom.” With identical potential host nations bidding to attract
a firm, each country is prepared to undercut its rival’s oﬀer such that, in equilibrium, all
of the winning nation’s gains from the foreign direct investment (FDI) are transferred to
the firm. Thus the winning (host) country fares no better than the losing nation, despite
receiving the investment. Haufler and Wooton (1999) show that the race to the bottom
is slowed when one nation is larger than the other. Such a size asymmetry results in the
larger country winning the bidding contest, as it is both more attractive to the investor and
is prepared to pay a larger subsidy (or oﬀer lower corporate taxation) in order to lure the
FDI. Despite the larger country’s greater willingness to pay to attract the FDI, it need only
slightly improve upon the oﬀer made by the rival, smaller country and thereby keeps some
of the benefits of the FDI that would otherwise be captured by the firm.
Ferrett and Wooton (2010) use the same framework as Haufler and Wooton (1999) to
explore whether ownership of the firm makes a diﬀerence to the equilibrium location or tax
1The terms “country”, “nation” and “region” will be used interchangeably, as competition for FDI may
be international or may take place between jurisdictions within an individual country.
2Davies (2005) lists various automotive plant incentive packages in Table 1 of his paper.
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rates. They investigate whether the assumption that the firm is owned entirely by individuals
who do not live in either bidding country is critical to the outcome. This is an important
question as most large firms in this globalized world are owned by shareholders who are
geographically dispersed. As an example, in December 2012, 34.8% of the shares of the
Japanese electronics company, Canon, were held by foreign citizens. Similarly, the ratio
of foreign shareholders in Sony was 32.7% in March 2013. Intuitively, one might expect
a country to bid more aggressively (oﬀering bigger subsidies to the firm) when its citizens
own a sizeable share of the firm, as much of the cost of the bid is merely a transfer from
the government of the country to its shareholding citizens. However, Ferrett and Wooton
(2010) establish an “invariance result” showing that the unique equilibrium of a tax/subsidy
competition game between two governments is independent of the international distribution
of the firm’s ownership. Their result applies both to the equilibrium location of the firm’s
plant and to the countries’ equilibrium tax/subsidy oﬀers. Thus the nationality of the firm’s
owner is irrelevant to the strategy that a potential host country should follow in oﬀering
investment incentives. This conclusion is significant in that it means that the policymaker
can simply ignore (or, indeed, never find out) the ownership of the firm.3
This argument, however, depends critically on the protocol of tax competition. As with
Haufler and Wooton (1999), Ferrett and Wooton (2010) treat the bidding contest as a si-
multaneous bidding (or sealed-bid, first-price auction) under complete information. What
is critical in this context is that raising a bid cannot induce a rival country to follow suit
and further increase its oﬀer. But, reality might not conform to this, with the possibility
that regions might counter each otherA˛fs bids with a better oﬀer. In an English auction
(or ascending-price auction), for example, an increase in one country’s bid may induce its
3This “invariance result” can be understood with an example. Consider a situation in which Germany
and France compete for a firm. Suppose that the two nations are equally attractive to the firm, so that
the firm will choose the country that oﬀers the higher bid. We further assume that German shareholders
hold 30% and French shareholders hold 20% of the firm’s shares. Let France oﬀer 100 million incentives
to the firm while Germany improves slightly upon this oﬀer and wins. In doing so, German shareholders
have lost 30 million, their share of the French oﬀer had it been successful. But at the same time, these
German shareholder receive 30 million out of the 100 million paid by their own government. Similarly,
French shareholders get 20 million regardless of which country wins. Thus, on balance, the shareholders
are unaﬀected by whichever country’s bid is successful in attracting the FDI. Consequently, the fact that
the bidding countries own shares in the firm does not change the outcome of the tax competition.
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rival to respond with a improvement on its own bid, driving up the incentives oﬀered to the
firm for its investment. In this paper, we examine the impact on the bidding equilibrium
of changing the contest from the sealed-bid auction of the existing literature to that of an
English auction.
It is diﬃcult to establish exactly what happens in reality, as bidding wars are often
shrouded in secrecy with limited information being made available during the bidding process
(and, indeed, after the deals are done). Ideally, we would like to find clear evidence of the
dominance of one or other structure, as we could then focus on the predicted outcomes of the
appropriate model in evaluating the distribution of benefits of FDI between host and firm.
Instead, we find often contradictory evidence as to how the competitions are conducted.
Some evidence in favour of an English auction can be found in the competition between
US states to attract a Volkswagen (VW) production facility in 2007-8. Starting from an
initial list of more than 100 potential sites, the candidates were gradually narrowed down
to Alabama, Michigan, and Tennessee. In the end, Huntsville, Alabama and Chattanooga,
Tennessee were the remaining sites in the competition, with Chattanooga being the ultimate
winner. A bidding war was oﬃcially denied.4 While the dealing largely took place behind
closed doors, there are indications of some degree of sequential bidding. For example, Ten-
nessee was reported by the Birmingham News (2008) to “having upped its oﬀer late in the
bidding, according to published records” while Alabama’s Governor is quoted in the Press
Register (2008) as stating that there “comes a point in an auction where you don’t want to
be the one with your hand in the air.” While not decisive, this case suggests that sequential
bidding may play a role in the competition to attract FDI. Consequently, analysing how the
equilibrium outcomes are aﬀected by the structure of the bidding process seems a worthwhile
endeavour.
If the equilibrium does not change with diﬀerent protocols, the bidding structure of the
contest can simply be ignored. But, should the timing of bids (simultaneous compared to
4“Mr Wade (Alabama Economic Development Oﬃce) and Mr Farr (Tennessee Economic and Community
Development Oﬃce) agreed that there was no bidding war between the states over incentives.” Chattanooga
Times Free Press (2008).
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sequential) aﬀect the outcome of the game, then the bidding structure will have to be taken
into account in the analysis of tax competition for FDI. We show that the firm cannot
be harmed by moving from simultaneous oﬀers to an English auction and that there are
circumstances under which it may actually benefit. As there are no legal procedures that
restrict the FDI search process to the use of sealed bids (unlike procurement rules in some
jurisdictions), the firm may wish to encourage sequential oﬀers in those situations from which
it would gain.
From the national perspective, we show that, in many situations, inducing its rival to
bid higher does not bring any benefits to a losing country. But it matters significantly if the
losing country owns part of the firm, as its citizens capture part of the winner’s bid. Thus
the losing country has an incentive to raise its bid to induce the other country to follow
suit. The greater the shares that its citizens own, the greater the benefit to the country from
pushing up the bids.5
This pressure to overbid may be tempered if the country is unsure about its rival’s
valuation of the investment and, consequently, how large an oﬀer it is prepared to make in
order to secure the investment. We therefore extend the model to accommodate incomplete
information with respect to national benefits from FDI.
1.1 Related literature
Tax competition among regions for attracting capital was first analyzed formally by Wil-
son (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).6 Black and Hoyt (1989) analyze bidding
competition for lumpy investment (or large firms), which has been followed by a now well
established literature on international competition for FDI (e.g., Haaparanta, 1996; Haaland
andWooton, 1999; Haufler andWooton, 1999; Fumagalli, 2003; Olsen and Osmundsen, 2003;
Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006; and Ferrett and Wooton, 2010).
Tax competition in the form of English auction has been considered in the literature (e.g.,
5As we shall show, the fact that the losing country has some ownership of the firm is all that matters for
the English auction, not the size of the loser’s share nor that the winning country owns any of the firm.
6See Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Dembour (2008) for literature surveys of tax
competition.
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by King, McAfee, and Welling, 1993) as an equivalent to the second-price auction. Black and
Hoyt (1989) and King, McAfee, and Welling (1993) depart also from a complete-information
framework and examine the bidding for a firm under incomplete information about the
firm’s local productivity.7 They demonstrate that the existence of uncertainty may cause
overbidding beyond the expected welfare benefit that would be brought by a firm and its
ineﬃcient location. In their models, bidding regions do not know their own valuations of the
FDI (or a region’s geographical advantage over the other region) at the time of the bidding.
In contrast to our model, regions would not bid beyond their individual valuations even if
these were known when they bid for the firm. Beyond this, Bond and Samuelson (1986) show
that, under incomplete information, tax holidays work as a signal for local productivity.8
We believe our paper to be the first to oﬀer a detailed comparison of the outcomes of first-
price and English auctions for FDI, where the international distribution of firm ownership
and uncertainty with respect to national gains from the FDI are both taken into account.
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), hereafter KRG, consider the outcome of tax compe-
tition for internationally mobile capital, examining the implications of allowing national
bids to be made sequentially. They find that if governments endogenously determine the
sequence of their bids the downward pressure on national bids (the so-called “race to the
bottom”) may be weakened and the familiar outcome that the larger country oﬀers a higher
tax rate than the smaller nation might be reversed. KRG’s analysis is extended by Ogawa
(2013) who shows that their results only hold when capital is owned by nonresidents, while
domestic ownership of the footloose capital results in a reinstatement of the outcome of
the simultaneous-bidding game. The model that KRG analyse is markedly diﬀerent struc-
ture from that in the present paper. Their analysis is couched within the conventional tax
competition framework where two national governments are bidding for the services of an
homogeneous factor, where the equilibrium will be characterised by capital locating in both
nations.
7See also Scoones and Wen (2001).
8Kaplan, Luski, and Wettstein (2003) extend Bond and Samuelson’s (1986) model to allow regions to
give grants to the firm in addition to lowering the tax rate.
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In contrast, our approach is rooted in another part of the literature on tax competition,
where the governments bid to attract the production facility of a single firm. The winning
nation gets the FDI while the loser gets nothing. Beyond this, KRG change the bidding
protocol in such a way as to allow sequential bids, but still restrict each government to a
single bid. In introducing the possibility of an English auction, we allow governments to
make multiple bids, so that the number of bids is endogenous, not just the order of bidding.
Like Ogawa, we examine the implications of the nationality of the owners of the capital. The
competition in our model is to attract a specific firm whose shareholders may be resident in
one or other of the two countries. This may reinforce the link between bids and ownership
compared to the case of competition for homogeneous, footloose capital.
There is a related literature in finance that examines the impact of ownership on the
outcome of an English auction (or second-price sealed bid auction). This is in the con-
text of takeover battles where the bidders have shares (or “toeholds”) in the target firm.9
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), Burkart (1995), and Singh (1998) show that bidders are more
aggressive in takeover contests when they have toeholds, and this may lead to ineﬃcient
outcomes in which the “winning” bidder loses from the acquisition of the firm. The analysis
is generally set in an incomplete information environment in which bidders’ valuations of
the firm are unknown to each other. While we consider the case of asymmetric information,
we assume initially that there is complete information which allows us to focus on the role
ownership plays when bids are simultaneous and when they are sequential. We also examine
situations where both bidders own shares in the firm while Burkart (1995), whose analysis
is closest to ours, focuses on the case where only one bidder has a positive toehold when
equilibrium properties are examined.
Our analysis is related to the theory of bidding with endogenous valuations [see, for
example, Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996)]. Essentially our firm is selling a non-divisible “good”
(the FDI) to one of two potential buyers. One of the countries, while unable to pay enough
to attract the FDI, can make oﬀers in order to reduce the negative externality of the firm
9When bidders have toeholds, the English auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction are equivalent
if there are only two bidders. See Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) and Burkart (1995).
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investing in the rival nation. It does this by pushing up the equilibrium winning bid and
thereby raising the after-tax profits of the firm, some of which are distributed to domestic
shareholders.
1.2 Outline of the paper
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. We outline a simple analytical
model of international competition for FDI in section 2. In section 3, we revisit simultaneous
bidding under complete information, setting it as our benchmark and confirming Ferrett and
Wooton’s (2010) invariance result that the winning bid equals the losing country’s valuation
of the FDI in the undominated Nash equilibrium, regardless of the international distribution
of the firm’s ownership. We show in Section 4 that this result is not robust to a change in the
auction protocol. In an English auction, if the citizens of a losing country own any shares
of the firm, the equilibrium winning bid equals the winner’s valuation of the FDI. Thus a
race to the bottom re-emerges despite the two countries having diﬀerent valuations of the
FDI. This arises whenever the losing country’s citizens own shares of the firm giving it an
incentive to push up its rival’s bid and the ultimate pay-out to the firm.
We then investigate the role of information in bidding strategies and the resulting equi-
librium bid. In section 5, we consider the situation where rival countries have incomplete
information regarding each other’s valuation of the FDI. When countries bid simultaneously,
each nation’s bid is smaller than its valuation of the FDI and the winning bid may be smaller
or greater than the losing country’s valuation. Each country’s bid increases with its citizens’
share of the firm. Thus Ferrett and Wooton’s (2010) invariance result also fails in the pres-
ence of incomplete information. Of more consequence is the fact that partial ownership of the
firm induces a country to bid more aggressively for the FDI, because its citizens re-capture
their ownership share of the bid which reduces the cost of an excessively high oﬀer.10 This
reason for aggressive bidding contrasts sharply with that in the English auction, as both
countries share an incentive to make higher bids when their citizens own part of the firm.
10It is easy to see that if its citizens own 100% of the firm, bidding for the FDI is virtually costless for the
country.
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In section 6, we combine our innovations to derive the equilibrium of the English auction
for FDI under incomplete information. We show that each country is prepared to bid more
than its valuation if its citizens own a share of the firm. This may result in a race beyond the
bottom, such that a country may lose by “winning” the auction. An ineﬃcient allocation
may also occur, in that the firm locates in the country with the lower valuation of the
FDI. Section 7 investigates how the potential overbidding and misallocation of FDI aﬀect
agents’ welfare and how these eﬀects are related to the international distribution of the firm’s
ownership. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The model
There are two countries,  and , bidding to attract the investment of a single firm. The
government of country  ( = ) makes an oﬀer of  to the firm in order to attract its
investment. When   0 the country is prepared to subsidize the investment, while   0
is a tax on the firm. We make the simplification that, in the absence of these transfers, the
firm is indiﬀerent between the two potential host locations as its profits are identical and
equal to  from producing in either country.11 After the governments make their bids, the
firm decides where to locate its plant while the product markets in countries  and  are
served in the final stage.
The benefit to country  of having local investment is assumed to be , while it gets 
( 6= ) when the firm produces in country  and services its market through international
trade. We assume that local investment is always preferred to imports and hence  ≡
 − , country ’s valuation of the FDI, is always positive.12 We assume, without loss of
generality, that  ≥   0 in the case where countries’ valuations are common knowledge.
11Thus there is no “geographical advantage” to the firm locating in one market relative to the other.
We make this assumption simply to reduce the notational complexity. Our results would be qualitatively
unchanged if, for example, pre-tax profits were higher in country  (as is assumed by Ferrett and Wooton,
2010).
12This preference for local production can be attributed to a number of causes. In Haufler and Wooton
(1999) it arises because locally produced goods are cheaper than imports from the other country. Among
other justifications for the desire to attract FDI are the increased demand for domestic workers that it
generates and the technological spillovers to indigenous industries from the increased the manufacturing
activity.
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Thus country  values the investment at least as much as country  does.13
In addition to the benefits of the FDI to the nation as a whole, country ’s citizens are
assumed to own a fraction  of the investing firm and consequently receive that share of the
firm’s after-tax profits. We write  for country ’s overall welfare benefit payoﬀ from the
firm locating in country . Then, country ’s welfare, dependent upon the location of the
investment, is given by
 = ( + )−  + 
 = ( + ) +   6= 
Let the net welfare benefit of hosting the firm be  ≡  −. Thus country  strictly
prefers hosting the firm if and only if
 = ( − )−  +   0 (1)
and is indiﬀerent to the location of the FDI if  = 0. As pre-tax profits are assumed to be
the same for the firm regardless of where it locates,  −  is the diﬀerence in the firm’s net
profits from choosing to invest in country .
3 Simultaneous bidding under complete information
We start with a sealed-bid auction, identical to that of Ferrett and Wooton (2010), where the
governments make their oﬀers simultaneously and irreversibly. This yields a multiplicity of
Nash equilibria. Ferrett and Wooton restrict their attention to outcomes where the countries
do not make weakly dominated bids. Thus neither country ever makes a bid higher than its
valuation of the investment.14 We shall, at least initially, not impose this limitation on the
potential equilibria.
13In section 5, we introduce incomplete information, at which point each country will know its own
valuation of the FDI but will only know the probability distribution of its rival’s valuation.
14This rules out cases where a country would lose if it were to succeed in attracting the firm and makes a
high oﬀer only because it is certain that the firm will reject the overly generous subsidy in favour of a better
deal being oﬀered by the other country which values the investment more highly. Indeed, it can be shown
that country ’s oﬀering at its own valuation  weakly dominates any oﬀer that is strictly higher than .
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Given that pre-tax profits of the firm are the same in both potential host countries,
country  wins the auction only if
 ≥ 
Country  will surely win if it oﬀers the firm a larger subsidy or lower tax than its rival,
country . Consider country ’s best response to its rival’s bid . We show that country 
should oﬀer:
(i)  = − if   −;
(ii)  =  +  if − ≤   ;
(iii)  ∈ (−∞ ] if  = ; and
(iv)  ∈ (−∞ ) if   ,
where   0 is an arbitrarily small number. These bids are explained as follows.
(i) If country  were to set tax greater than the firm’s pre-tax profits, the firm would make
a loss if it located in that country and would never invest there. All that country 
needs to do in order to attract the firm is to make an oﬀer that would allow it at least
to break even, that is  +  ≥ 0. Thus, country ’s optimal strategy is to set tax
such that it fully extracts the firm’s profits from the FDI.
(ii) Were country  to oﬀer a smaller tax (or grant a subsidy) to the firm such that it
would makes an after-tax profit from its FDI, country  would have to improve on its
oﬀer in order to win the auction. The winning bid is a tax/subsidy that gives the firm
 more in after-tax profits than it would get from locating in country .
(iii) There are limits to country ’s generosity, however, as it will only be prepared to oﬀer
a subsidy up to its valuation of the FDI when it has a chance of winning the auction.
If country  were to oﬀer a subsidy equal to country ’s valuation such that  = ,
country has two options. It can either try to attract the FDI by matching country’s
bid. In such a case, it follows from (1) that  = 0, meaning that country  receives
no benefit from the investment. Otherwise, country  could make a lower bid that
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would ensure that it lost the auction. Thus, regardless of whether or not country 
wins the auction, it receives .
(iv) If country  bids above country ’s valuation of the investment, any bid that would
beat country ’s oﬀer would result in   0 and consequently country  will ensure
that it loses.
Country ’s best response function is derived in an identical fashion.
If the two countries had identical valuations of the FDI,  =  = , then each country
would bid its valuation and the equilibrium bids would be identical, ∗ = ∗ = . The firm
would then be indiﬀerent between locations and might invest in either country. The winning
nation would be no better oﬀ than the loser, as all of the rent from the investment would be
transferred to the firm in the subsidy. This is the familiar race to the bottom in taxes.
We assume, instead, that   . In this case there are multiple Nash equilibria,
such that country  oﬀers a subsidy in the range ∗ ∈ [ ] while country  wins the
auction by matching its rival’s subsidy with ∗ = ∗. It is easy to see that, given country 
wins the auction, neither country has an incentive to deviate from their prescribed strategies.
Country ’s equilibrium bid can be viewed as the limit strategy as  goes to zero. Country 
attracts the FDI at minimum cost, given its rival’s bid, so has no incentive to deviate.
Country , on the other hand, wishes to lose the contest given country ’s bid, and this is
the outcome in equilibrium.
Ferrett andWooton’s (2010) result, that the international distribution of the firm’s owner-
ship is irrelevant to the outcome of the game, can be understood by considering the objective
function of country  given by (1). The citizens’ ownership of the firm  is multiplied by the
diﬀerence in the two countries’ bids; the citizens in country  capture the fraction  of their
country’s bid but lose the opportunity to capture the same fraction of the rival nation’s bid.
It might seem that this should influence the equilibrium oﬀers and perhaps the location of the
FDI. However, the bids made by the countries are such that the firm is only just persuaded
to locate in one location over the other. Thus, in equilibrium, the bids are equal because
the firm considers the two locations as being equally attractive. Consequently the first term
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in (1) is zero with domestic shareholders being unaﬀected by the equilibrium location of the
FDI. Thus the distribution of ownership of the firm has no eﬀect on the strength of national
bids nor on the eventual locational choice of the firm in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In the sealed-bid, first-price auction, there exist multiple Nash equilibria
unless  = . If   , country  attracts the investment with a winning bid
∗ ∈ [ ]. If  =  = , the location of the firm is indeterminate and the entire benefit
of the investment is transferred to the firm through the equilibrium bids of ∗ = ∗ = . Fur-
thermore, the international distribution of the firm’s ownership does not aﬀect the countries’
bidding strategies.
Let   . If country ’s equilibrium bid is equal to its valuation of the FDI, that
is ∗ = , then country  will win the auction with the minimum subsidy by matching
country ’s subsidy. If ∗ ∈ ( ), country ’s equilibrium bid is strictly greater than
, its valuation of the FDI. Country  can make such a bid because it “knows” that
country  will match the bid in order to win the auction.
Although this argument is important in understanding the equilibrium in later sections,
one may argue that such Nash equilibria are not appealing. Indeed, any bid 0 that is strictly
greater than  is dominated by  = . We can demonstrate this by considering the best
response of country  to any bid . (i) If   , then  =  is strictly preferable to
 = 0 because country  would still win the auction with less payment to the firm. (ii) If
 ≤   0, then  =  is strictly preferable to  = 0 because winning the auction in
this case entails a loss for country  as (0−)−0+ ≤ − ≤ 0. (iii) If  = 0,
then  =  is preferable to  = 0 should country  win the auction while it would
be indiﬀerent between them when country  wins. Finally, (iv) if country  bids   0,
then country  is indiﬀerent between  =  and  = 0. Similarly, a bid by country ’s
that exceeds  is dominated by  = . Thus each country oﬀers at most its valuation of
the FDI in its undominated strategies. Consequently, the undominated Nash equilibrium,
which is the Nash equilibrium with a pair of undominated strategies, is uniquely determined
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as ∗ = ∗ = , with country  winning the auction.15
Proposition 2 If   , there exists a unique undominated Nash equilibrium in which
∗ = ∗ =  and the firm locates itself in country . The winning bid is the minimum bid
of all the Nash equilibrium bids.
4 An English auction under complete information
We now change the auction protocol to that of an English auction, in which each country
has the opportunity to respond to the bid of its rival. As we discussed in the Introduction,
this structure might be a better reflection of what has taken place in some cases of inter-
governmental competition for FDI, where the investing firm has attempted to play potential
host countries oﬀ against each other and thereby extract the highest oﬀer. We want to
determine how the equilibrium outcome of the competition is aﬀected by the switch from
simultaneous to sequential bids. We shall find that the ownership of the company will have
an impact on the equilibrium bid, though the location of the FDI will be unchanged. Thus,
the invariance result of Ferrett and Wooton (2010) is not robust to a change in the timing of
bids. In particular, the ownership share of the “losing” nation will aﬀect what the “winning”
country has to pay to attract the FDI.
Following the initial bid of one country, its rival has the choice whether or not to make
a higher oﬀer to the firm. We assume that new bid is ∆  0 above the existing standing
bid. We continue to assume that pre-tax profits are the same in both locations for the firm,
consequently the winner will be the country whose standing bid does not attract an improved
bid from the other nation.
Country  will certainly improve its bid as far as its net welfare benefit of hosting the firm
is positive. That is, letting country ’s standing bid be , it follows from (1) that country 
will raise its bid to  =  +∆ if
 ≥  + (1− )∆ (2)
15The undominated Nash equilibrium is the outcome considered by Ferrett and Wooton (2010).
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Country  will improve its bid as long as the additional cost (that part of the extra incentive
that does not accrue to shareholders in country ) does not push the cost of the subsidy
beyond the country’s valuation of the FDI should it become the host nation. Country  will
not be worse oﬀ by bidding either as long as (2) holds should it lose the auction. Indeed,
should country  lose the auction, it has an incentive to bid even beyond its valuation  if
  0.
If  =  ≡ , neither country will raise its bid beyond  in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) because it would violate (2) for winning country . Thus, in the
limit equilibrium as ∆ goes to zero, either country  or  wins the auction with its winning
bid of . That is, if the two countries value the FDI equally, the outcome is the same
race to the bottom that arises in the simultaneous game, where the winning bid matches
the nation’s valuation of the investment. This result is independent of national ownership
shares in the firm. Consequently, the outcome of tax competition between identical countries
is independent of the timing of bids and the choice of an English auction or simultaneous
sealed-bid auction is irrelevant to size of the equilibrium, winning bid.
The story will be very diﬀerent, however, if countries have diﬀerent valuations. When
countries have diﬀerent , the nation with the higher valuation will attract the firm and this
will be independent of which country makes the first bid. We now assume for the remainder
of this section that country  has a strictly higher valuation of the FDI than has country ,
that is   , and derive the limit equilibrium of the SPNE of the bidding game.
We examine in the case where    whether or not country  has an incentive to
raise its bid beyond its valuation when  ∈ ( ). Country  knows that country  will
reply to its bid of  = +∆ for a small ∆ as long as (2) holds for  =  with  = +∆,
that is whenever  + ∆ + (1 − )∆ ≤ . Therefore, country  can raise ’s winning
bid from  to  + 2∆ if it oﬀers  + ∆ and make no bid in the succeeding round. In
following this strategy, country  gains 2∆ relative to its having stopped bidding in the
earlier round. Country  continues to bid beyond its valuation and country  counters the
bid as long as    when ∆ is arbitrarily small.
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If citizens of country  have no ownership shares in the firm ( = 0), there exist multiple
SPNE whose outcomes are the same as in the case of the sealed-bid auction. Country ’s
winning bid must be at least , otherwise country  would continue to bid. Moreover,  is
indiﬀerent to any  ∈ [ ] so long as it loses, since it gets  in any event. Country 
also knows that its bid will be countered if country ’s bid is in this range. So the eventual
loser can raise country ’s winning bid to any level in this range. As with simultaneous
bidding, however, the undominated SPNE outcome is that country  wins the auction with
its winning bid of .
In contrast, if part of the firm is owned by the citizens of country  (that is,   0),
the SPNE will be unique and characterized by country  winning with a bid of . This
is because country  knows that country  will be prepared to raise its bid as long as
  . Consequently country  will bid beyond its own valuation of the FDI in order to
force up the payment to the firm, as a share of this subsidy is paid to its own citizens. This
result contrasts sharply with those in the previous literature, such as Haufler and Wooton
(1999) as well as our benchmark case, in which the winning nation need only oﬀer as much
as the rival’s valuation of the firm. Moreover, it is also diﬀerent from the result of Ferrett
and Wooton (2010) in that the firm’s ownership structure aﬀects the equilibrium outcome
significantly.
Proposition 3 In an English auction under complete information when   , the sub-
game perfect equilibrium depends on the value of . If  = 0, the equilibrium outcomes are
the same as in the case of sealed-bid first-price auction with multiple subgame perfect equi-
libria, although the undominated subgame-perfect equilibrium is uniquely determined with
country ’s winning bid of . If   0, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
in which country  wins the auction with its winning bid of . If  =  = , the location
of the firm is indeterminate and the entire benefit of the investment is transferred to the firm
through an equilibrium bid of .
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5 Simultaneous bidding under incomplete information
Let us now examine the eﬀect of incomplete information about countries’ valuations of the
FDI on the outcome of the simultaneous bidding.16 We assume that the benefits received
both from attracting FDI and from importing are a country’s private information. That is,
 and  are known only to country . However, we assume that the probability distribution
of country ’s valuation of the investment (≡ −) is common knowledge. The bidding
environment is an auction with independent private values;  and  are independently
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function [], for  = , with a
corresponding continuous density function of [].
Let ˜() denote the equilibrium bidding of country  as a function of its valuation of
the FDI. Country , for example, wins the auction and obtain ( + ) −  +  if
 ≥ ˜(), and loses the auction and obtain ( + ˜()) +  otherwise.17 Thus,
country  chooses  to maximizeZ
≤˜−1 ()
[(+ )− +][]+
Z
˜−1 ()
[(+ ˜())+][]
The first-order condition for this maximization problem can be written as³
˜−1
´0
()[˜−1 ()]
n
[ − ˜(˜−1 ())]−  + 
o
= (1− )[˜−1 ()] (3)
The left-hand side of (3) shows the expected benefit from raising the bid slightly from .
The chance of winning increases if ˜() equals , the probability density of whose event
equals
³
˜−1
´0
()[˜−1 ()]. By winning the auction, country ’s shareholders as a whole
obtain  instead of ˜(˜−1 ()). This gain is obviously nil because increasing the bid
slightly from  would change the winner from  to  only when () is equal to .
Therefore, the net welfare gain from overturning the auction result equals  − . The
16Panteghini and Schjelderup (2006) examine tax competition when the firm can choose the timing of
the FDI in the presence of uncertainty on the value of the investment. Although introducing additional
uncertainty is out of scope of the paper, we would be able to enrich the model in an interesting way if
the value of the FDI and a country’s valuation are positively correlated; if the bidding follows a sequential
auction, the English (ascending-price) auction or Dutch (descending-price) auction, the firm continues to
learn the value of FDI as the auction proceeds.
17Without loss of generality, we may assume that country  wins the auction when the two countries’ bids
are equal.
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right-hand side of (3) shows, on the other hand, the expected loss from raising the bid. With
probability [˜−1 ()], country  wins the auction even without raising the bid. Thus, in
such cases, country  would lose the fraction 1−  of the increment of the bid by raising
the bid unnecessarily.
We can solve (3) for  to obtain country ’s bidding function, which is implicitly defined
by
˜() =  − (1− )[˜
−1
 (˜())]
(˜−1 )0(˜())[˜−1 (˜())]
 (4)
We find from (4) that ˜()   if   1. Country ’s bid approaches  as  increases
to one. Similarly, we can readily obtain country ’s bidding function as
˜() =  − (1− )[˜
−1
 (˜())]
(˜−1 )0(˜())[˜−1 (˜())]
 (5)
Proposition 4 In the presence of incomplete information regarding the other country’s val-
uation of the FDI, each country’s bid is smaller than its own valuation. The bid increases,
however, with the share of the firm owned by its citizens.
Recall that if the countries’ valuations are common knowledge, each country is willing to
raise the bid up to its own valuation, but they both choose the bid equal to the smaller of the
nations’ valuations as their undominated strategies. Under incomplete information, neither
country knows which has the lower valuation of the FDI. Therefore, they both make bids
that are lower than their own valuations, in order to capture a positive net benefit should
they win the auction. Their bids increase with their ownership shares of the firm, since their
own citizens re-capture a part of their bids in proportion to their shares of the firm. Hence
the eﬀective costs of countries raising their bids are lower when they have larger ownership
shares. If  = 1, in particular, country ’s eﬀective costs of bidding equal zero, so that the
equilibrium bid ˜() matches its valuation of the FDI, .
6 An English auction under incomplete information
Finally, we consider what might be the most relevant form of tax competition in practice:
an English auction under incomplete information regarding countries’ valuations of the FDI.
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As in the previous section, country ’s valuation  is private information although its prob-
ability distribution, characterized by a cumulative distribution function [], is common
knowledge.
Country ’s strategy in the English auction for the FDI is characterized by its threshold
of dropping out of the auction. Country  will only counterbid if the expected payoﬀ from
raising the standing bid by ∆ is not less than the guaranteed payoﬀ from dropping out of
the auction and letting its rival attract the FDI. This permits us to determine country ’s
threshold bid as ¯(), the value of the standing bid at which the expected returns from
staying in the auction and from dropping out are equalized. Thus, country  will only stay
in the auction, making a counterbid to country  if the latter’s last bid is below country ’s
threshold bid, that is  ≤ ¯().
Country , for example, counters the standing bid  if the expected payoﬀ from making
a bid of  =  + ∆ is greater than or equal to that from dropping out of the auction
immediately. If country  does make a new bid, there are two possible outcomes. First, it
would win the auction if country  does not to respond with its own counterbid. This would
arise with probability
( +∆) ≡ Prob[ +∆  ¯()| −∆ ≤ ¯()]
=
[¯−1 ( +∆)]− [¯−1 ( −∆)]
1− [¯−1 ( −∆)]  (6)
the probability that country’s bid  = +∆ exceeds’s threshold bid ¯() conditional
on the event that  is large enough that  has countered ’s previous bid of −∆, that is
 −∆ ≤ ¯(). The second outcome is where country  does respond to country ’s bid
with a higher oﬀer (after which country  will have to decide once again whether to make
a further bid), which would arise with probability 1 − ( + ∆). Country  calculates
the expected payoﬀ that it would receive from making a new bid and compares this to the
guaranteed payoﬀ from dropping out of the auction without further bidding.
Country ’s expected payoﬀ from making a new bid when the standing bid is , which
is denoted by (), is at least as large as the expected payoﬀ from making a new bid and
dropping out of the auction in its next turn if the new bid is countered by . Country 
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will certainly stay in the auction and make a new bid if this specific bidding strategy gives
country  a higher payoﬀ than dropping out of the auction immediately. Thus, we have the
following sequence of the inequalities:
()
≥ [( +  +∆)− ( +∆) + ]( +∆) + [( +  + 2∆) + ][1− ( +∆)]
≥ ( + ) +  (7)
If ( +∆) = 0, the first term of the middle expression in (7) is zero and country  will
definitely continue to bid. In this case, it is certainly worthwhile for country  to make a
further bid, even if it eventually loses the auction, as the payment made to citizens owning
some shares of the firm is driven up. If, at the other extreme, (+∆) = 1 and country ’s
next bid would certainly win the auction, the decision as to whether to make a further bid
depends upon country ’s valuation of the FDI relative to the cost of attracting it, that is
whether  exceeds  + (1− )∆. This argument is made more transparent if we rewrite
the second inequality of (7) by subtracting the right-hand side from the left-hand side as
[ −  − (1− )∆]( +∆) + 2∆[1− ( +∆)] ≥ 0 (8)
Substituting (6) into (8), we obtain a new suﬃcient condition for country to be prepared
to make a further bid
[ −  − (1− )∆]
1− [¯−1 ( −∆)]
[¯−1 ( +∆)]− [¯−1 ( −∆)]
2∆ + 
1− [¯−1 ( +∆)]
1− [¯−1 ( −∆)] ≥ 0
Once again, we let ∆→ 0 to obtain
( − )[¯
−1
 ()]¯−10 ()
1− [¯−1 ()] +  ≥ 0
where ¯−10 () = ¯−1 ()  0. This can be rewritten as
 ≤  + ¯
0(¯−1 ()){1− [¯−1 ()]}
 [¯−1 ()]  (9)
where we have used ¯−10 () = 1¯0(¯−1 ()). Thus country  would be prepared to make
a further bid if (9) is satisfied.
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The threshold bid for country , ¯(), is determined implicitly as  that satisfies (9)
with equality. This is because when country  is indiﬀerent between making a new bid and
dropping out of the auction, () = ( + ) +  should hold in (7), and hence all
weak inequalities in (7) and (8) hold with equality. Consequently, country ’s threshold bid
can be written as
¯() =  + ¯
0(¯−1 (¯())){1−  [¯−1 (¯())]}
[¯−1 (¯())]  (10)
Similarly, we obtain country ’s threshold bid as
¯() =  + ¯
0(¯−1 (¯())){1− [¯−1 (¯())]}
[¯−1 (¯())]  (11)
Observe in (10) and (11) that if  = 0, then ¯() = . Country  has no incentive to bid
above its valuation  in order to push up the rival country’s bid, and thereby risk “winning”
the auction, as none of this will benefit citizens in country . If on the other hand   0,
country  is willing to risk trying to raise the winning bid, hoping that its rival eventually
wins the auction. The threshold bid balances the cost of potentially winning the auction
with a bid above the country’s valuation and the benefits of an increase in the payout to
shareholders should the country lose the auction.
Proposition 5 In an English auction under incomplete information, if  = 0 then each
country  continues to bid until the standing bid reaches its own valuation of the firm ,
otherwise when   0 it bids beyond its valuation. The higher is , the higher is the threshold
bid. As a consequence, a country that has some ownership of the firm may lose by winning
the auction.
An example
To gain more insights of the result, let us specify the probability distribution as the expo-
nential distribution with the support [∞) for  ≥ 0, i.e.,
[] = 1− exp[−( − )]
[] =  exp[−( − )]
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This probability distribution has a mean of  + 1 and a variance of 12 . Moreover, we
have for  = 
1− [¯−1 ()]
[¯−1 ()] =
1
 
for any . Thus, threshold bids expressed in (10) and (11) can be rewritten as
¯() =  +  
¯() =  +  
The larger the share of the firm held by a country, the greater its willingness to continue
in the auction, in order to push up the expected redistribution of after-tax profits to its
own citizens. Moreover, the higher the mean (and hence the variance) of the rival country’s
valuation, the greater its willingness to continue the auction, since the risk of winning the
auction is smaller when it raises the bid at any stage of the auction.
To further examine the properties of the equilibrium, let us look at several specific cases.
1.    and  =  = 0.
Country  wins with the winning bid of . The outcome is the same as those in
both simultaneous bidding under complete information and the undominated subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome when  = 0 in an English auction under complete infor-
mation. It is worthwhile to note that, in the English auction, making the information
about countries’ valuations private (as opposed to public) eliminates all of the subgame-
perfect equilibria with winning bids by country  higher than its evaluation . This
is because, when the information is incomplete, country  is no longer confident that
country  would match ’s bid beyond .
2.    and  =   0.
Country  wins with the winning bid of  + (). The winning bid may exceed
country ’s valuation  if  is large or  is small; country ’s threshold bid is high
if country  has a large incentive to raise the rival country’s winning bid (i.e.,  is
large) or if the risk of country ’s winning with a bid beyond  is small (i.e.,  is
21
small). Note also that this outcome is more likely to occur if  is large or  is small
so that country ’s threshold bid is more likely to exceed that of country .18
3.  =  and  =   0.
Either country  or country  wins the auction with the winning bid of +() =
 + (), which certainly exceeds the winner’s valuation of the FDI. The two
countries race beyond the bottom if they are symmetric.
4.    and  + ()   + ().
Country  wins the auction even though country ’s valuation of the FDI is higher
than that of country . The resulting location of the firm is ineﬃcient, and country 
certainly loses by winning the auction.
We summarize some of the above findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In an English auction under incomplete information, a country may lose by
winning the auction. This race beyond the bottom is more likely to occur if  and  are
large and  and  are small so that the countries’ threshold bids are large. The country
with a lower valuation of the FDI than the other may win the auction if its citizens hold a
large share of the firm or if the mean of the other country’s valuation of the FDI is large.
7 Welfare comparisons
In this section, we compare the allocation eﬃciency and each party’s welfare between the
two auction protocols of simultaneous bidding and the English auction. In order to simplify
the exposition, we assume here that   0 for  =  and  +   1.
We begin with the welfare comparison under complete information, maintaining our
assumption that   . As we have shown in sections 3 and 4, country , as the
country with the higher valuation, always wins in this case. and consequently the FDI is
eﬃciently allocated. The firm’s revenue from the bidding equals  in the undominated Nash
18In this example,  = .
22
equilibrium in the case of the simultaneous bidding and  in the case of an English auction.
The firm unambiguously prefers an English auction to simultaneous bidding, as does the
losing country  which reaps a higher benefit for its domestic shrareholders. Country ,
on the other hand, prefers simultaneous bidding. Aggressive bidding in an English auction
therefore benefits both the firm and the losing country but harms the winner.
We now turn to the case of incomplete information. We consider the case in which the
probability distributions of the valuations are the same between the two countries, assuming
that  = 0 for  6=  for simplicity. Without loss of generality, we assume that  ≥ .
In order to derive concrete results and obtain some useful insights, we further assume that
both  and  are uniformly distributed on [0 1].19 It follows from (4) and (5) that the
countries’ bidding functions can be written as follows in the case of the simultaneous bidding:
˜() = 
2−   :: ˜() =

2−   (12)
Similarly, we obtain the bidding functions in the case of an English auction from (10) and
(11):
¯() =  + 
1 +   :: ¯() =
 + 
1 +   (13)
We can easily confirm that country ’s bid rises as  increases in both auction protocols.
For the FDI to be eﬃciently allocated, country  should win if and only if   .
But when  and  are positive, this may not happen. If  = , country  wins if and
only if    as we see from (12) and (13) in both protocols. Even if the presence of the
shareholding aﬀects both countries’ bidding incentives, it aﬀects symmetrically between the
countries so that no distortion in the outcome would arise. If   , on the other hand,
country  may win the auction even though    if  and  happen to be close.
To see which bidding protocol achieves a higher ex ante eﬃciency, we calculate the
expected eﬃciency losses caused by misallocation of the FDI and compare them in the two
bidding protocols. In the case of simultaneous bidding, country  wins the auction when
eﬃciency requires country  to win if and only if (2 − )(2 − )    . Thus,
19Unlike the exponential distribution function considered in the previous section, the uniform distribution
allows us to explicitly derive the bidding functions in both auction protocols.
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we can write the expected eﬃciency loss asZ 1
0
Z 
(2−)
2−
( − )  = ( − )
2
6 (2− )2  (14)
Similarly, country  wins the auction when eﬃciency requires country  to win if and only
if     [(1 + ) +  − ](1 + ) in the case of an English auction. Thus, we
can write the expected eﬃciency loss asZ 1
0
Z (1+)+−
1+

( − )  = ( − )
2
6 (1 + )2  (15)
Note that the eﬃciency loss is zero if  =  in both protocols. It is also straightforward
from (14), (15), and 2−   1+  (which is equivalent to +   1) that the eﬃciency
loss is smaller in the case of simultaneous bidding than in an English auction.
Whether the firm’s expected revenue is higher in an English auction than with simulta-
neous bidding depends on the levels of  and . The firm’s expected revenue equals
˜ =
Z 1
0
⎡
⎣
Z (2−)
2−
0
˜() +
Z 1
(2−)
2−
˜()
⎤
⎦ 
=
1
2 (2− ) +
2− 
6 (2− )2
in the simultaneous bidding and
¯ =
Z 1
0
⎡
⎣
Z (1+)+−
1+
0
¯() +
Z 1
(1+)+−
1+
¯()
⎤
⎦ 
=
1 + 2
2 (1 + ) −
1 + 
6 (1 + )2
in the English auction. Figure 1 shows the regions of ( ) (with the restriction of + 
1 and   ) in which the firm’s expected revenue is higher in one protocol than the other.
As the figure indicates, the firm benefits from aggressive bidding in an English auction in
most cases. But the firm’s expected revenue is higher with simultaneous bidding if  is very
large and  is very small. In this region, country  is likely to win the auction because  is
so much greater than . Since the winning country pays the losing country’s bid, however,
the revenue when country  wins is not large for small .
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Now, let us compare country ’s expected welfare between the two protocols. Country
’s welfare equals
˜ =
Z 1
0
⎧
⎨
⎩
Z (2−)
2−
0
( + ˜()) +
Z 1
(2−)
2−
[( + ˜())− ˜() + ]
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
(16)
in the simultaneous bidding and
¯ =
Z 1
0
⎧
⎨
⎩
Z (1+)+−
1+
0
[( + ¯())− ¯() + ]
+
Z 1
(1+)+−
1+
( + ¯())
)
 (17)
in an English auction. Figure 2 shows the regions of ( ) in which country ’s expected
welfare is higher in one protocol than the other. As the figure shows, country  prefers
simultaneous bidding if  and  are close. In such cases, country ’s chance of winning is
not much greater than that of country . Since the eﬃciency loss and the firm’s expected
revenue are both smaller in simultaneous bidding in this region, the joint surplus of the two
countries is greater. That is why country  prefers the simultaneous bidding when  is not
much bigger than . If, however,  is large and  is small, country  prefers an English
auction. The greater is , the more country  benefits when it loses. Moreover, the smaller
is , the more country  benefits when it wins, because it makes a smaller payment to
the firm (country ’s bid). This explains why country  prefers an English auction if  is
suﬃciently larger than .
The expected welfare of country  can be written similarly to (16) and (17) and is
therefore omitted. It can be shown that country , as the country that has a smaller
ownership share of the firm, always prefers simultaneous bidding to an English auction. If
 is not much smaller than , then country  prefers simultaneous bidding for the same
reason that country  does. If  is suﬃciently smaller than , country  also prefers
simultaneous bidding for the exactly the opposite reason as to why country  prefers an
English auction.
The following proposition summarizes our findings for this specific example.
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Proposition 7 Suppose that  and  are stochastic and each is independently and uni-
formly distributed on [0 1]. Then, the expected eﬃciency loss is greater in an English auction
than with simultaneous bidding. Nevertheless, the firm prefers an English auction in most
cases except when  is suﬃciently greater than . Country , as the country that has a
higher share of the firm, also prefers an English auction in most cases except when  is only
slightly larger than . Country , on the other hand, always prefers simultaneous bidding.
Having shown that aggressive bidding in the English auction generally reduces the joint
surplus of potential host countries of the FDI, we can discuss what these countries can do to
avoid harmful tax competition.20 When overbidding is serious, as in the case where  and
 are large, bidding countries have a strong incentive to mitigate the competition. Some
sort of coordination is possible especially if the countries belong to the same economic region,
such as the EU, or if the bidding parties are regional governments of a country.21 Indeed,
the European Commission, for example, urges member states to refrain from harmful tax
competition. Supranational authorities or federal governments may also be able to coordinate
bidding to prevent potential hosts of the FDI from bidding sequentially. Financial constraints
that face the bidding parties can also mitigate tax competition. Recent financial crisis may
have such unintended consequences.
8 Conclusion
This paper has investigated countries’ bidding strategies for a firm and the resulting equilib-
rium bids across a wider range of bidding environments than are traditionally examined. In
a world of complete information and when the firm is truly “foreign” (that is, owned entirely
by citizens of other countries), an English auction yields the same outcome, with respect
to the equilibrium bid and the location of the FDI, as that of the familiar, simultaneous,
20Fumagalli (2003) emphasizes a positive aspect of tax competition by showing that tax competition
facilitates firm’s eﬃciency-enhancing location decisions.
21Kessing et al. (2009) point out that vertical fiscal ineﬃciency in federalism entails reduced incentive to
attract FDIs, which oﬀers another reason why regional governments of a country may be able to refrain from
entering harmful tax competition.
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sealed-bid auction. As a result, the choice of auction protocol is irrelevant to the outcome
of the competition.
If, however, citizens of bidding countries own shares of the firm, the outcomes diﬀer.
The equilibrium winning bid is greater in an English auction than in simultaneous bidding.
Thus, the pressures for a “race to the bottom” in taxes are stronger when countries have the
opportunity to respond to bids than in the case of simultaneous sealed-bid auctions. This
creates a motive for firms to encourage potential host nations to respond to bids oﬀered
by their rivals. Asymmetry of information on countries’ valuations of the firm’s investment
naturally adds ex ante uncertainty about the winner’s identity and the winning bid, as well
as generating the potential for ex post ineﬃciency of the firm’s location. As a result, it is
possible that the location of the FDI will be ineﬃcient.
Elements of our results appear in the finance literature on takeovers of firms, such as
Burkart (1995). As far as we are aware, we have provided the first application to international
tax competition to attract a firm’s FDI. Moreover, we have disentangled the roles played by
national ownership shares and incomplete information in yielding diﬀerent outcomes from
simultaneous-bidding contests and English auctions.
How relevant are our results? We have found some evidence from the USA that investing
firms try to encourage states to improve on existing bids by their rivals, suggesting that the
bidding structure may in some cases be closer to the sequential nature of an English auction
than that of the sealed-bid, first-price auction. Our analysis has shown that, when the bid-
ding states have ownership shares in the firm, the manner in which the auction is conducted
is of critical importance for its outcome. With respect to the VW example discussed in the
introduction, one could reasonably argue that the citizens of Alabama and Tennessee are un-
likely to have significant shareholdings in the German firm and, consequently, the diﬀerences
in outcomes are unlikely to be important. But that does not mean ownership will never play
a role. Suppose that a similar competition were to take place for a new VW production
facility, but this time in Europe. VW is predominantly a German company including a sig-
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nificant degree of state ownership.22 Our analysis suggests that this could play a significant
role in determining the winning bids for any new European production facilities.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the firm’s revenue.
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Figure 2: Comparison of country A’s expected welfare.
